

Message Text

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FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2263

INFO SECDEF WASHDC

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 SALT TWO GENEVA 1630

EXDIS/SALT

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E.O. 11652: XGDSI

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: SEMENOV STATEMENT, MARCH 12, 1974 (SALT TWO--407)

FOLLOWING ARE TRANSLATIONS OF (1) SEMENOV STATEMENT, (2) TRUSOV STATEMENT, AND (3) SHCHUKIN STATEMENT, PRESENTED AT MEETING, TUESDAY, MARCH 12, 1974.

SEMENOV STATEMENT, MARCH 12, 1974

IN THE COURSE OF PAST DISCUSSIONS THE USSR DELEGATION HAS SET FORTH ITS POSITIONS ON A WHOLE SERIES OF QUESTIONS WHICH MUST BE RESOLVED IN WORKING OUT THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE AGAIN THE NECESSITY FOR APPROPRIATE RESOLUTION IN THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT OF THE QUESTION OF FORWARD-BASED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS AND LIQUIDATION OF CORRESPONDING BASES ON THE TERRITORY OF THIRD COUNTRIES. WE HAVE TABLED THE PROPOSALS OF THE USSR ON THIS QUESTION. FOR THE SOVIET SIDE THIS IS A QUESTION OF PRINCIPLE. AND IT

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MUST BE RESOLVED ON THE BASIS OF PRINCIPLE, ALSO. UNLESS IT

IS RESOLVED, ACHIEVEMENT OF A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE PERMANENT AGREEMENT ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IS IMPOSSIBLE.

IN ADDITION, I WOULD LIKE TO DRAW ATTENTION TO THE PROPOSALS OF THE SOVIET UNION, FORMULATED IN THE SOVIET DRAFT OF OCTOBER 9, 1973, CONCERNING LEVELS FOR QUANTITATIVE LIMITATIONS ON LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS, SLBM LAUNCHERS AND MODERN SLBM SUBMARINES. THESE PROPOSALS ARE BASED ON THE PROVISIONS OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT OF MAY 26, 1972. WE HAVE CITED ARGUMENTS WHICH DEMONSTRATE THAT SUCH A SOLUTION IS IN ACCORD WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE.

IN THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSIONS AT THIS PHASE IN GENEVA THE USSR DELEGATION, AS WELL AS THE U.S. DELEGATION, DEVOTED A GREAT DEAL OF ATTENTION TO, AMONG OTHER THINGS, QUESTIONS OF QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS ON THESE WEAPONS.

WITH DUE RESPECT FOR THE IMPORTANCE OF WORKING OUT SUCH PROVISIONS FOR THE DRAFT PERMANENT AGREEMENT, THE USSR DELEGATION WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THAT WITH RESPECT TO THESE QUESTIONS, TOO, AN OBJECTIVE APPROACH IS NEEDED, ONE WHICH TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE TRUE STATE OF AFFAIRS. TO ESTABLISH SOME SORT OF PRIORITY FOR THE RESOLUTION OF QUESTIONS CONCERNING QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS, AND IN SO DOING INTRODUCE THE ELEMENT OF THE DEGREE OF AND CLASSIFICATION BY IMPORTANCE OF SOME TYPES OF WEAPONS OR OTHERS, WOULD BE TO ALLOW THE POSSIBILITY OF SUBJECTIVE AND ONE-SIDED APPROACHES TO THE SOLUTION OF THIS IMPORTANT PROBLEM.

IN OUR VIEW SUCH ONE-SIDEDNESS OF APPROACH IS CHARACTERISTIC OF THE PROPOSALS ON PRIORITY ACHIEVEMENT OF AGREEMENT TO THE LIMITATION OF MIRVED ICBMS, WHICH ALLEGEDLY IS OF PRIMARY IMPORTANCE FOR WORKING OUT THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT. AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONSIDERATIONS EXPRESSED HERE CONCERNING QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, AND IN PARTICULAR ON MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLES, SHOWS THAT THERE ARE NO GROUNDS FOR ATTACHING PRIORITY TO SOME SORT OF A CONDITION ON WHICH CONSIDERATION OF ALL OTHER QUESTIONS WOULD DEPEND, I.E., TO THE PROPOSAL TO LIMIT MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLES ON ICBMS ONLY.

IN THIS CONNECTION ONE CANNOT BUT TAKE NOTE OF THE EXTENSIVE PROGRAM BEING CARRIED OUT IN THE U.S. TO EQUIP SLBMS WITH MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLES, AS WELL AS TO IMPROVE THEM QUALITATIVELY. FOR
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EXAMPLE, ACCORDING TO WIDELY KNOWN CALCULATIONS PUBLISHED IN THE U.S. PRESS, IT IS PRECISELY ON SLBMS THAT TWO-THIRDS OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF MIRV WARHEADS WILL BE DEPLOYED WITHIN THE NEXT TWO TO THREE YEARS.

SUCH A PROGRAM, AS WELL AS STATEMENTS ON THIS QUESTION BY U.S. OFFICIALS, CLEARLY SHOW THE ROLE ASSIGNED BY THE U.S. SIDE TO SLBM MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLES IN TERMS OF INFLUENCING THE STRATEGIC SITUATION AT PRESENT AND IN THE FUTURE.

THERE IS NO NEED TO TRY TO PROVE THAT THE TASK ASSIGNED TO US OF AGREEING ON EFFECTIVE MEASURES FOR THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS REQUIRES THAT SPECIFIC LIMITATIONS BE WORKED OUT FOR MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLES FOR BOTH ICBMS AND SLBMS. THESE LIMITATIONS, OF COURSE, MUST BE WORKED OUT ON THE BASIS OF STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE.

THE QUESTION OF LIMITING THE THROW-WEIGHT OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS HAS ALSO BEEN RAISED IN THE DISCUSSIONS AT THE CURRENT PHASE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF UNDERSTANDING THE POSITIONS OF THE SIDES ON THIS QUESTION I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE ONCE AGAIN THAT IF THIS QUESTION IS TO BE CONSIDERED AT ALL, ACCOUNT SHOULD BE TAKEN OF THE AGGREGATE THROW-WEIGHT OF SUCH TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AS LAND-BASED ICBMS, SLBMS, STRATEGIC BOMBERS AND DELIVERY AIRCRAFT ABOARD ATTACK CARRIERS, IN THEIR TOTALITY.

AT THE MEETING ON MARCH 8, 1974 THE USSR DELEGATION EXPRESSED THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE SOVIET SIDE ON THIS QUESTION. WE WOULD LIKE TO EXPLAIN THAT THE SOVIET SIDE PROCEEDS FROM THE PREMISE THAT WITH RESPECT TO AIRCRAFT, THROW-WEIGHT WOULD BE CALCULATED AS THEIR MAXIMUM BOMB LOAD.

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 4 SALT TWO GENEVA 1630

EXDIS/SALT

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

AS FOR FORWARD-BASED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS, AS I HAVE ALREADY

EMPHASIZED, THIS IS A QUESTION OF PRINCIPLE AND, ACCORDING TO THE PROPOSAL OF THE SOVIET SIDE, THEY MUST BE WITHDRAWN TO THEIR OWN NATIONAL TERRITORIES, AND THE CORRESPONDING BASES ON THE TERRITORY OF THIRD COUNTRIES MUST BE LIQUIDATED.

MR. AMBASSADOR, AN IMPORTANT FACTOR INFLUENCING THE STRATEGIC SITUATION AND DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE SUBJECT OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS IS THE EXISTENCE AND BUILD-UP OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIRD COUNTRIES.

IN NO WAY QUESTIONING THE BILATERAL NATURE OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS, IN ASSESSING THE OVERALL STRATEGIC SITUATION, ESPECIALLY WITH RESPECT TO THE FUTURE, THE EXISTENCE AND BUILD-UP OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIRD COUNTRIES NEVERTHELESS MUST NOT BE LOST SIGHT OF. IN WORKING OUT CONCRETE MEASURES ON THE LIMITATION OF THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES, ONE MUST NOT FAIL TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE FACT THAT AT THIS VERY SAME TIME OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS ARE DEVELOPING AND CAN BUILD UP SUCH WEAPONS.

THE QUESTION OF THE EXISTENCE AND BUILD-UP OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIRD COUNTRIES HAS ALSO BEEN DISCUSSED TO A CERTAIN EXTENT AT OUR NEGOTIATIONS EARLIER, FOR EXAMPLE, WHILE WORKING OUT CONCRETE LIMITATIONS FOR THE INTERIM AGREEMENT ON
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CERTAIN MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

NOW, WHEN THE DELEGATIONS FACE THE TASK OF WORKING OUT THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, THE FACTOR OF THE EXISTENCE AND BUILD-UP OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIRD COUNTRIES, AS WELL AS THE DEGREE OF ITS IMPORTANCE FOR THE SIDES, CANNOT BUT BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT MORE FULLY.

ONLY WITH A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH WHICH TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE VARIOUS FACTORS INFLUENCING THE STRATEGIC SITUATION, INCLUDING THE FACTOR OF THE EXISTENCE AND BUILD-UP OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIRD COUNTRIES, CAN EQUITABLE LEVELS OF LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS BE ESTABLISHED.

THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT SUCH AN APPROACH IS OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE IN TERMS OF WORKING OUT A VIABLE AGREEMENT OF UNLIMITED DURATION ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

MR. AMBASSADOR, IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS THE SIDES HAVE SPOKEN MORE THAN ONCE IN FAVOR OF NOT TAKING ANY ACTIONS WHICH WOULD IN FACT CONSTITUTE CIRCUMVENTION OF THE AGREEMENTS THROUGH THIRD COUNTRIES, FOR EXAMPLE, BY THE TRANSFER TO THEM OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

AS YOU KNOW, THE SIDES RECOGNIZED THE NEED FOR INCLUDING SUCH A PROVISION, SPECIFICALLY IN THE TREATY ON THE LIMITATION OF ABM SYSTEMS. A CORRESPONDING UNDERTAKING BY THE SIDES IS RECORDED IN ARTICLE IX OF THE TREATY.

IN THE COURSE OF PAST DISCUSSIONS IN GENEVA BOTH SIDES
AGREED IN PRINCIPLE THAT THE QUESTION OF NON-TRANSFER OF
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IS IMPORTANT AND MERITS ATTENTION
IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS.

ON THE BASIS OF THE COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF THE
IMPORTANCE OF THIS PROBLEM, THE SIDES SHOULD MAKE EFFORTS TO
WORK OUT CONCRETE PROVISIONS WHICH COULD BE INCLUDED IN THE
TEXT OF THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT.

THE SOVIET SIDE PROCEEDS FROM THE PREMISE THAT IT IS
NECESSARY TO REACH AN UNDERSTANDING WHICH WOULD PROVIDE FOR
AN UNDERTAKING BY THE SIDES NOT TO TRANSFER STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
ARMS TO OTHER STATES AND NOT TO DEPLOY THEM ON THEIR TERRITORY,
NOR TO PROVIDE TO OTHER STATES TECHNICAL DESCRIPTIONS OR BLUE-
PRINTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, SPECIALLY WORKED OUT FOR THE
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DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. IT WOULD ALSO BE
VERY IMPORTANT FOR THE SIDES TO ASSUME AN OBLIGATION NOT TO
TAKE ANY ACTIONS WHICH COULD LEAD TO A WEAKENING OR CIRCUMVENTION
OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT THROUGH A
THIRD STATE OR THIRD STATES.

THIS IS PRECISELY THE CONTENT OF ARTICLE XIV OF THE
SOVIET DRAFT PERMANENT AGREEMENT OF OCTOBER 9, 1973. WE
ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO REACHING AN UNDERSTANDING TO THAT EFFECT.

REACHING AGREEMENT ON THIS QUESTION WOULD MEET THE
TASKS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT, WOULD
CONTRIBUTE TO ENHANCING ITS VIABILITY AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
THE LIMITATIONS PROVIDED THEREIN, AND THIS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY
BE IN THE INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES AND IN ACCORD WITH THE SPIRIT
AND LETTER OF THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS, TO WHICH EACH OF OUR COUNTRIES IS A PARTY.

THE USSR DELEGATION, FOR ITS PART, IS READY TO PROCEED
TO DRAFTING SPECIFIC MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE LANGUAGE ON THE NON-
TRANSFER OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS TO THIRD COUNTRIES. WE
ARE ALSO PREPARED TO CONSIDER APPROPRIATE PROPOSALS ON THIS
SCORE FROM THE U.S. SIDE.

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S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 4 SALT TWO GENEVA 1630

EXDIS/SALT

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

TRUSOV STATEMENT, MARCH 12, 1974

TODAY I WOULD LIKE TO TALK ABOUT THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS--THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE--AND ABOUT WAYS OF IMPLEMENTING IT IN ACCOMPLISHING THE TASK OF WORKING OUT A DRAFT PERMANENT AGREEMENT ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

BOTH SIDES RECOGNIZE THIS PRINCIPLE. THE NECESSITY OF BEING GUIDED THEREBY IN WORKING OUT A PERMANENT AGREEMENT HAS BEEN RECORDED IN THE DOCUMENTS SIGNED AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL IN 1972 AND 1973.

THE SOVIET SIDE, GUIDED BY THIS PRINCIPLE, PROCEEDS FROM THE PREMISE THAT IN PREPARING A DRAFT AGREEMENT IT IS NECESSARY TO CONSIDER ALL TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WHICH ARE CAPABLE OF REACHING THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE, AS WELL AS COMPREHENSIVELY TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE FACTORS INFLUENCING THE STRATEGIC SITUATION, INCLUDING THE PARTICULAR FEATURES OF THE GEOGRAPHIC SITUATION OF THE SIDES, THE EXISTENCE OF NUCLEAR SYSTEMS BASES OF ONE OF THE SIDES ON FOREIGN TERRITORIES, AND THE EXISTENCE AND BUILD-UP OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIRD COUNTRIES. SUCH AN APPROACH PERMITS A TRULY OBJECTIVE
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RESOLUTION OF THE QUESTIONS OF DETERMINING THE COMPOSITION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND LEVELS FOR THEIR QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS, AS WELL AS THE WORKING OUT OF OTHER MEASURES RELATED TO THE PROBLEM OF LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

WHILE RECOGNIZING THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, THE U.S. DELEGATION ALLOWS IT TO BE INTERPRETED IN A VERY ONE-SIDED MANNER, IN

ESSENCE SUBSTITUTING FOR IT THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY OF A CERTAIN PORTION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. TO JUSTIFY THIS THE U.S. DELEGATION'S STATEMENT OF FEBRUARY 22, 1974 CONTAINS THE CONSIDERATION THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY "IS THE CARDINAL PRINCIPLE THAT MADE POSSIBLE THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE ABM TREATY." THE SAME STATEMENT SAYS: "THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT THE SAME PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY SHOULD GUIDE OUR DELIBERATIONS IN THE PREPARATION OF A PERMANENT AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS."

THE QUESTION ARISES--JUST WHICH PRINCIPLE GUIDES THE U.S. SIDE AT OUR NEGOTIATIONS: THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, WHICH THE LEADERS OF OUR COUNTRIES SET DOWN AS THE BASIS FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, OR THAT PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY OF SYSTEMS, WHICH IN THE PAST FORMED THE BASIS FOR WORKING OUT THE ABM TREATY.

YOU WILL RECALL THAT DURING NEGOTIATION OF THE ABM TREATY THE SIDES WERE GUIDED BY THE MAY 20, 1971 UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN OUR GOVERNMENTS, IN WHICH IT WAS ESTABLISHED THAT THE CONDITIONS FOR THE LIMITATION OF ABM SYSTEMS IN THE USSR AND THE U.S. MUST BE EQUAL FOR BOTH SIDES AND MUST NOT GIVE ANY ADVANTAGE TO EITHER. AND THIS WAS QUITE UNDERSTANDABLE.

BY REASON OF THE SPECIFIC FEATURES OF ABM SYSTEMS--DEPLOYMENT ON NATIONAL TERRITORIES ONLY, THEIR ABSENCE IN THIRD COUNTRIES, THE POSSIBILITY OF BANNING THEIR DEPLOYMENT BEYOND NATIONAL TERRITORIES, THE FACT THAT THEIR DEPLOYMENT WAS IN THE BEGINNING STAGE, ETC.--IT WAS POSSIBLE AND NECESSARY TO LIMIT THEM TO EQUAL LEVELS.

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS ARE ANOTHER MATTER ENTIRELY. THEREFORE THE WORDING OF THE PRINCIPLE UNDERLYING THE NEGOTIATION OF A PERMANENT AGREEMENT WITH RESPECT TO STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS ALSO DIFFERS RADICALLY FROM THE ONE UNDERLYING NEGOTIATION OF THE ABM TREATY. IN THIS CASE IT IS NOT EQUALITY

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OF TERMS FOR LIMITING ANY INDIVIDUAL SYSTEMS OR GROUPS THEREOF, WHICH OBJECTIVELY COMES TO FORE, BUT THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE WITH RESPECT TO THE WHOLE PROBLEM OF LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

WE HAVE ALREADY SAID THAT IF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WERE DEPLOYED ON THEIR OWN NATIONAL TERRITORIES ONLY, THE PROBLEM OF LIMITING THEM WOULD BE SIMPLER. THEIR DEPLOYMENT, HOWEVER, IS FAR FROM LIMITED TO THEIR OWN NATIONAL TERRITORIES ONLY.

THE AREAS OF NAVIGATION OF SLBM SUBMARINES AND ATTACK CARRIERS WITH NUCLEAR DELIVERY AIRCRAFT ABOARD INCLUDE A MAJOR PART OF THE WORLD OCEAN, AND IN THIS CONNECTION THE U.S. HAS CORRESPONDING BASES ON FOREIGN TERRITORIES. U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBERS ARE DEPLOYED NOT ONLY ON THEIR OWN NATIONAL TERRITORY, BUT ALSO AT OVERSEAS BASES. U.S. FORWARD-BASED NUCLEAR

SYSTEMS, SUPPORTED BY BASES IN THIRD COUNTRIES, ARE WITHIN RANGE OF TARGETS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE. IT IS ALSO KNOWN THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS EXIST AND ARE BEING BUILT UP IN THIRD COUNTRIES. WHAT ANALOGY WITH ABM SYSTEMS CAN BE SPOKEN OF UNDER THESE CONDITIONS?

A SERIOUS AND OBJECTIVE APPROACH TO SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS REQUIRES THAT THIS PROBLEM, WITH ALL OF THE SPECIFIC FEATURES INHERENT ONLY TO IT, BE CONSIDERED IN A CONCRETE AND THOUGHTFUL MANNER, AND THAT MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS BE FOUND, WHICH ARE TRULY BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL

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EXDIS/SALT

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

ADVANTAGE. ANY ATTEMPTS AT A SUBSTITUTION FOR THIS PRINCIPLE CAN ONLY LEAD AWAY FROM A CONSTRUCTIVE SEARCH FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS FOR THE WHOLE RANGE OF PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN WORKING OUT THE PROVISIONS OF THE DRAFT PERMANENT AGREEMENT.

SHCHUKIN STATEMENT, MARCH 12, 1974

THE PROVISIONS OF THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, THE NEGOTIATION OF WHICH IS THE TASK ASSIGNED TO US, MUST, THE SOVIET SIDE IS CONVINCED, ENCOMPASS NOT ONLY EXISTING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS, BUT ALSO THOSE, THE

DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF WHICH IN THE FUTURE COULD THREATEN TO UNLEASH THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE IN NEW DIRECTIONS AND AREAS.

ON MARCH 5, 1974 THE SOVIET SIDE PRESENTED THE APPROPRIATE PROPOSALS OF THE USSR GOVERNMENT ON THE LIMITATION OR PROHIBITION OF A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC TYPES OF SUCH WEAPONS.

AT THE SAME TIME, THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT INHERENT TO THE PROCESS OF THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ARE BROAD POSSIBILITIES THAT NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS MAY APPEAR, INCLUDING THOSE BASED ON THE USE OF OTHER PHYSICAL PRINCIPLES. SUCH NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC

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OFFENSIVE WEAPONS COULD TURN OUT TO BE COMMENSURATE WITH AND EVEN SURPASS IN EFFECTIVENESS THOSE WHICH EXIST AT PRESENT. THE LACK OF APPROPRIATE PROVISIONS ON THESE NEW TYPES OF WEAPONS IN A PERMANENT AGREEMENT ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS COULD LEAVE UNBLOCKED AN ADDITIONAL CHANNEL FOR THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE IN NEW AREAS.

IN THE INTERESTS OF ENSURING THE VIABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AGREEMENT ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IT IS NECESSARY TO INCLUDE IN IT A PROVISION TO THE EFFECT THAT THE QUESTION OF BANNING OR LIMITING ANY NEW STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS NOT COVERED BY THE AGREEMENT, INCLUDING THOSE BASED ON OTHER PHYSICAL PRINCIPLES, WOULD BE SUBJECT TO ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION AND AGREEMENT, AS PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE XI OF THE SOVIET DRAFT OF OCTOBER 9, 1973. IN CONNECTION WITH THE QUESTIONS WHICH AROSE AT THE LAST PHASE WITH RESPECT TO THE CONTENT OF THE AFOREMENTIONED ARTICLE, THE SOVIET SIDE EXPRESSES ITS WILLINGNESS TO ADD TO THIS ARTICLE AN UNDERTAKING BY THE SIDES NOT TO TAKE ACTIONS WHICH COULD LEAD TO A WEAKENING OR CIRCUMVENTION OF THE LIMITATIONS PROVIDED FOR IN THE AGREEMENT, THROUGH THE DEPLOYMENT OF SUCH STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS.

ARTICLE XI OF THE SOVIET DRAFT AGREEMENT WITH THE ABOVE ADDENDUM WOULD APPLY TO BOTH SIDES, AND IT IS FULLY IN ACCORD WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE. IT WOULD SEEM THAT INCLUSION OF THIS ARTICLE IN THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT WOULD MEET THE INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES AND THAT AGREEING ON ITS CONTENT WOULD NOT PRESENT DIFFICULTIES.

WE LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING THE CONSIDERATIONS OF THE U.S. SIDE ON THAT SCORE. JOHNSON

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